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Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil
Procedure
Mary Kay Kane*
Much of modem federal procedural developments liberalizing
pleading, expanding jurisdiction, enlarging the scope of claims and parties
allowed to be joined in a single lawsuit, and ultimately expanding the
binding effect given to judgments has been accomplished through the sub-
stitution of a transaction standard for various common law or code formu-
lations concerning these issues. Superficially, this might seem to suggest
that a unified concept now underlies all of modem procedure. But, as was
so eloquently stated by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, even before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more
legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has
and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all
through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and
must constantly be guarded against.'
It is true that courts do not appear to have been misled by the use of
the term "transaction" in these different contexts.2 Indeed, seldom does
one find courts borrowing from one context to support the definition of a
transaction in another setting Rather, the transaction standard has been
* Dean & Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1968,
J.D. 1971, University of Michigan.
1. Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 337 (1933).
2. As recognized by Professor Wright, no really serious attempts have been made to define the
term "transaction," noting the general futility of all definitions. See Charles Alan Wright, Estoppel
by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modem Pleading, 39 IOWA L. REv. 255, 270 (1954).
Rather, courts have preferred to suggest tests or factors that serve as guidelines to aid in determining
whether a given set of claims should or should not be joined because they satisfy the transaction
standard. See id.
3. An exception may be in cases dealing with the joinder rules and the development of ancillary
(now called supplemental) jurisdiction. But there the interplay and related purposes of the two proce-
dural developments make such exchanges understandable, if not almost necessary. See infra text
accompanying notes 98-101. Thus, for example, Professor Wright, in a presentation examining the
1966 amendments to the federal rules, discussed the question whether a third-party plaintiff should be
able to join to an impleader claim some other claim that he might have against the third-party
defendant. See Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, in Proceedings of the 29th Judicial
Conference of the Third Circuit, 42 F.R.D. 552 (1966) (reporting remarks of Charles Alan Wright).
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applied, for the most part, consistent with the purpose of the procedure or
rule for which it is the foundation. 4 Further, it is certain that Professor
Charles Alan Wright, to whom this Symposium is dedicated, never would
have fallen into the trap of treating the transaction standard as anything but
a nuanced term designed to provide courts flexibility and some discretion
in developing the policies underlying each of the areas in which it is
utilized.5 Thus, one might ask how an article exploring the development
of the transaction standard contributes to the field of federal civil procedure
and therefore belongs in an issue of the Texas Law Review celebrating the
enormous contributions to the field by my esteemed colleague and friend,
Professor Wright.
The difficulty is that courts most often do not articulate how the poli-
cies underlying a particular procedure or rule influence or shape their defi-
nitions of what constitutes a transaction. Explicit judicial reasoning that
would ground particular applications of the transaction standard in the poli-
cies that underlie the specific issues involved would allow for better scrut-
iny of the propriety of the results reached. This, in turn, would help to
avoid possible misinterpretations and provide better guidance to the bar
about how to predict and understand whether the facts and circumstances
involved in particular cases do or do not meet the requirements at issue.
Failing to provide such an analysis leaves open the door for some confu-
sion in the bar, and even more commonly, among law students who are
struggling to find certainty in learning the language of the law and often
are prone to Professor Cook's original sin.
He recognized that Rule 18 controlled, but offered no particular limitation or governing principle. See
id. at 559-60. Consequently, the question was one of jurisdiction, rather than rule practice, and it
should be decided by determining whether the claim of the third-party plaintiff "arises out of the very
transaction which is the subject of the third-party claim," in which case jurisdiction ought to be present.
Id. at 560-61.
4. Because courts seldom explain their applications of transactional standards by highlighting how
their conclusions reflect the kind of policy analysis I am suggesting in this piece, the assertion that most
decisions accurately reflect the relevant underlying policies cannot be substantiated explicitly. But this
piece is not designed to challenge judicial results. Rather, it focuses on the reasoning that can justify
many results reached.
5. As Professor Wright noted in an article exploring changes to the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure and the decision to use the concept of a transaction to control the scope of compulsory
counterclaims:
Our inquiry now must be, what is the meaning of "transaction." The literature and the
case law on this word are voluminous. The United States Supreme Court has called it "a
word of flexible meaning." Certainly cases can be found which say that "transaction"
refers only to business negotiations, and therefore does not include torts within its orbit.
The trouble is that even more authorities can be found which are precisely contrary, and,
most important for our purpose, Minnesota falls in this latter class.
Charles Alan Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REv.
580, 591 (1952) (citations omitted).
1724 [Vol. 76:1723
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Unfortunately, turning to a treatise-even Federal Practice and
Procedure-will not help the struggling law student or novice lawyer
because the nature of treatise writing leads to an examination of each area
separately, presenting all the case law and providing a thorough analysis
of the support for and interpretation of the term in each particular
context.6 Treatise writers do not commonly seek to cross area boundaries
to compare how similar terms may or may not be used in similar ways in
different contexts, unless doing so provides helpful precedent.7 Nor will
students find much help in consulting a dictionary. There, they would find
that a transaction is "something that is transacted" or "a communicative
action or activity involving two parties or two things reciprocally affecting
or influencing each other."8 Indeed, even legal dictionaries, which
attempt to offer more detailed insight, provide little guidance in proper
interpretation because of their desire to capture all possible nuances.9
The purpose of this article is to fill that gap. It explores the use and
role of the transaction standard in four different settings in federal civil
procedure: (1) Federal Rule 15(c), governing the relation back of pleading
amendments after the statute of limitations has run; (2) Federal Rules 13
and 20, governing the joinder of counterclaims, cross-claims, and
parties; 0 (3) the development of ancillary jurisdiction, currently codified
as supplemental jurisdiction in Section 1367;" and (4) the development
6. In most instances, admittedly, the treatise explication of the application of the transaction stan-
dard in a particular setting should provide sufficient guidance to those who consult it. But the problem
is not with the lawyer who engages in such research. Rather, it is with the attorney who knows of the
application or scope of the transaction standard in one setting and simply assumes that the same conclu-
sions can or should be reached in another-the attorney who falls into "original sin."
7. When lumping together two related, but differing, situations under the same standard results
or is likely to result in confusion, then the problem may be explored. See, e.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3625,
at 618 (2d ed. 1984) (criticizing the Judicial Conference Committee that drafted the 1958 amendment
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) for saying that it would be easy to determine "the principal place of business"
of a corporation because there were many cases interpreting the same words in § I 1 of the Bankruptcy
Act); id. § 3567.2 at 152 (criticizing the courts in cases involving pendent-party jurisdiction for
lumping "together indiscriminately cases involving each of the three different contexts in which the
question of pendent parties had been litigated").
8. WEBSrER's THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2425-26 (1986).
9. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (6th ed. 1990). Black's defines a transaction as:
Something which has taken place, whereby a cause of action has arisen. It must therefore
consist of an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connectionwith
each other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations
of such persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term than "contract."
Id. (citing U.S. Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Ebenstein, 96 P.2d 661, 662 (Kan. 1939), opinion adhered
to on reh'g, 152 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1940)).
10. Federal Rule 14(a), governing third-party claims, also utilizes a transaction standard for pur-
poses of authorizing the joinder of additional claims once a third-party defendant has been joined. The
underlying policies applicable to that joinder situation, however, are essentially identical to those on
which Rules 13 and 20 are based and thus will not be separately analyzed here.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
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of modem claim preclusion, as reflected in the decisional law and in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments.12 Admittedly, in each of these four
settings, although the governing standard is a transactional one, additional
relationships are included as well. For example, just reviewing the federal
rules which utilize a transaction standard, Federal Rule 15(c) refers to
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence"; 3 Rules 13(a) and 13(g) refer to
claims arising out of the same "transaction or occurrence"; 4 and Rule 20
includes even broader language, authorizing parties to be joined when the
claims involved arise out of a "series of transactions or occurrences.
" IS
These additional elaborations quite obviously can and should affect the
results obtained-that is, whether a particular rule's standards are satisfied.
But those distinctions are unimportant for purposes of this inquiry because
my focus is not on harmonizing the results in the four areas I have
identified. Rather, it is on how interpretations of what constitutes a
transaction must be understood and made in light of the different underly-
ing policies in each area. Thus, my intent is to explore how those differing
policies may alter or shape the interpretation of the term "transaction" in
some unique ways-to provide a comparative overview.
In this way, I hope to offer some insights and guidance about the
important nuances involved in interpreting this core legal term. And that
objective is, I believe, in keeping with the lifetime devotion of Professor
Wright to his students and to the profession, a devotion by which he has
been able to provide insight and cogency to areas that others find lacking
in clarity, and thus, ultimately, to advance the growth and development of
the law.
I. The Meaning of Transaction as Interpreted Through Policy
In order to engage in a comparison of the proper treatment of what
constitutes a transaction in the four areas I have identified, we must first
12. Readers interested in an extended treatment of how the term transaction has been interpreted
by the courts in each of these settings may refer to the following: on Federal Rule 15(c) (relation back
of amendments), see 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497, at 70-79 (2d ed. 1990); on Rules 13(a) (counterclaims) and 13(g)
(cross-claims), see 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410, at 50-58, § 1432, at 243-46 (2d ed. 1990); on Rule 20 (party
joinder), see 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653, at 381-86 (2d ed. 1986); on ancillary jurisdiction, see 13 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3523, at 106-16 (2d ed. 1984); and on claim preclusion, see 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4407, at 55-56, 62-64
(1981).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), (g).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
1726 [Vol. 76:1723
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briefly examine the underlying policies that inform the term's interpretation
in each area.
A. Rule 15(c), Relation Back of Pleading Amendments
Two general principles that underlie Federal Rule 15, the general fed-
eral amendment rule, are particularly applicable to subdivision (c), which
governs the relation-back of amendments. 6 First, the rule encourages a
liberal amendment practice in order to promote the opportunity to decide
claims on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities. 7 Second,
amendments are to be allowed consistent with the recognition that the
pleadings in federal practice have the limited role of providing parties
notice of what the action entails, rather than being relied upon for fact
revelation or issue formulation." These two principles support a very
broad and liberal approach to amendments. When determining whether to
allow a proposed amendment adding a new claim or a new party after the
statute of limitations has run, however, notice becomes an important coun-
tervailing concern. 9 If the pleadings provided adequate notice that a par-
ticular transaction is involved, then the defendant is not entitled to the
protection of the statute of limitations .0 On the other hand, if the court
cannot find that the transaction as stated in the original pleadings gave the
defendant adequate notice that the proposed new matter might be involved
in the lawsuit, then the defendant should be able to rely on the expiration
16. Rule 15(c) states in relevant part that:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations
applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will
not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would
have been brought against the party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
17. See 6 WpuGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 12, § 1471, at 506-07.
18. See id. § 1471, at 507.
19. See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 665 F. Supp. 248, 255
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("In deciding whether an amendment relates back, the principal inquiry is whether
adequate notice has been given.... ."), aff'd, 842 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1988); Sengerv. Soo Line R.R.,
493 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Minn. 1980) ("To decide whether an amendment relates back, the primary
focus of the court is on the notice given to the opposing party ..... ).
20. See. e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Nevada Power Co., 950 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991);
Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1982); Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F.
Supp. 1561, 1565-66 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
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of the limitations period and the amendment will be deemed time barred.2'
Fairness to the defending party demands that result. Consequently, the
requirement that the proposed amendment arise out of the same transaction
as elaborated in the original pleadings must be interpreted in light of that
fairness concern and with an eye toward what legitimately should have
been known or recognized as within the scope of the litigation as a result
of the initial pleadings .'
B. Rules 13 and 20, Claim and Party Joinder
The role of the transaction requirement in the joinder context is quite
different from that in the amendment arena. The use of the concept of a
transaction as a basis for deciding which claims and parties are properly
joined in a lawsuit (and in some instances required to be joined) has been
part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since their adoption in 1938.
The standard is one derived from equity. 3 It permits joinder premised
on notions of trial convenience, rather than resolving those questions based
on inquiries into what substantive rights are involved, as was done at com-
mon law. This change, from reliance on more restrictive code formulas
of what constituted a cause of action to a transaction standard, generally
was lauded as one permitting the courts discretion to determine the proper
scope of a lawsuit in light of convenience to the courts and to the litigants,
thereby avoiding the necessity to relitigate the same issues in different
lawsuits. As noted by Professor Wright in an article commenting on simi-
lar developments in state procedure: "[C]ourts do not exist to formulate
concepts; they exist, rather, to adjudicate controversies .... Any device
which will reduce the volume of litigation and end the necessity for
litigating the same issues over and over in different lawsuits is highly
desirable."24
Thus, modem joinder policy is to encourage resolving controversies
in one lawsuit rather than many, and that policy underlies the determination
21. See, e.g., McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 863-64 (5th
Cir. 1993); Percy v. San Francisco Gen. Hosp., 841 F.2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1988); Marine Midland
Bank v. Keplinger & Assocs., 94 F.R.D. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte
Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. When an amendment seeks to add a new party, notice concerns are heightened even further
and Rule 15(c) includes additional requirements to ensure that sufficient notice exists. See generally
6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 12, § 1498 at 107; Sherman L. Cohn, New Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1235-37 (1966).
23. See FED. EQ. R. 30 in JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUrrY RULES 209 (8th
ed. 1933) ("The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the
transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit ... ."); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 13 advisory
committee's note 1 (1939) (describing Federal Rule 13 as substantially the same as a broadened Equity
Rule 30).
24. Charles Alan Wright, Modem Pleading and the Alabama Rules, 9 ALA. L. REV. 179, 196-97
(1957).
[Vol. 76:17231728
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of what may constitute a transaction for purposes of Federal Rules 13 and
20. 25 Weighed against that objective is the consideration whether the
claims or parties are sufficiently related so that determining them in a
single trial will be convenient.
To effectuate those policies when interpreting the joinder rules, courts
most frequently have invoked the flexible test of whether the proposed
claims are "logically related" and thus should be tried together. 6 Indeed,
this test was suggested in a pre-rule case decided by the Supreme Court
involving compulsory counterclaims, Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange,' when the Court commented: "'Transaction' is a word of flex-
ible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending
not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their
logical relationship."' The logical relationship test has been utilized by
the courts to determine the propriety of joinder when the question posed is
whether the defendant is allowed to assert a cross-claim against a co-
defendant under Federal Rule 13(g)29 or whether plaintiffs may join
together in asserting claims against a defendant or a plaintiff may join
25. Rule 13(a), which governs compulsory counterclaims, states in relevant part that:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
Rule 13(g), which covers cross-claims against co-parties, states in relevant part that:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
Rule 20(a), which governs permissive joinder of parties, provides in relevant part that:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all these persons will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
26. In the compulsory counterclaim arena, courts actually have utilized the following four different
tests: (1) The same issue of fact and law test: "Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?" (2) The res judicata test: "Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim?" (3) The same evidence test: "Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?"
and (4) The logical relation test: "Is there any logical relation between the claim and counterclaim?"
6 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 12, § 1410, at 52-55 & nn.7-10. It is clear, however, that
the logical relationship test has the widest acceptance in the courts. See id. § 1410, at 65.
27. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
28. Id. at 610.
29. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143,
147 (6th Cir. 1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 87 F.R.D. 1, 5 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Old Homestead
Bread Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 47 F.R.D. 560, 563 (D. Colo. 1969).
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several defendants in a single action under Federal Rule 20,30 as well as
when the issue is whether the defendant is required to assert a counterclaim
because it is compulsory under Federal Rule 13(a). 31 In all of these
instances, when the courts consider whether the claims presented are logi-
cally related and thus meet the transaction requirement, the underlying
philosophy guiding their decisions is to allow or require joinder if doing
so will expedite the resolution of the entire controversy between the
parties.'32  As will be explored later,33 however, in the case of compul-
sory counterclaims, that inquiry also may involve additional concerns such
as when the question is raised not at the outset of the litigation but after it
has concluded, so that Rule 13(a) is being invoked for purposes of prevent-
ing a party from introducing a claim on the ground that it was improperly
omitted from an earlier action.
C. Ancillary (Supplemental) Jurisdiction
The parallel, if not identical, policy of encouraging judicial efficiency
and economy underlies the development of ancillary jurisdiction.' 4 The
30. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Intraco, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 554, 556 (S.D. Iowa 1995);
McLernon v. Source Int'l, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Dougherty v.
Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267, 278 (D. Del. 1987).
31. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977); Great
Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961); Grumman Sys.
Support Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 125 F.R.D. 160, 164 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Establissement Tomis v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
32. For a discussion of the purposes underlying Rule 13, see 6 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 12, § 1403, at 15-16. For a discussion of the purposes underlying Rule 20, see 7 WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 12, § 1652, at 371-75.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
34. Care must be taken not to assume total co-extensiveness between the rules and jurisdictional
precedent because the ultimate determination regarding jurisdiction involves factors in addition to
whether the claims arise out of the same transaction, so that a court may decline jurisdiction even
though the transaction standard is satisfied. Section 1367(c) states that:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994).
For one example of a court refusing to hear a claim when jurisdiction was authorized, see James
v. Sun Glass Hut of California, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Colo. 1992) (declining to exercise jurisdic-
tion when the three state claims clearly predominated over the sole federal claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). For additional background on this topic, see generally John B.
Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 735, 766-67 (1991) (mentioning respect
1730
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availability of ancillary jurisdiction ensures that federal courts are able to
completely dispose of disputes that otherwise might be subject to piecemeal
litigation because of the limited jurisdiction conferred on the federal
courts. 5 As long as the court has proper jurisdiction over the principal
case, then additional matters may be joined in order to permit complete
adjudication. 6
Here, however, the use of a transaction standard to assess when it is
appropriate to exert jurisdiction over these additional matters was not a
product of rule definition, but rather a result of judicial decisions. The
standard was later implicitly endorsed by Congress in its 1990 codification
of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. section 1367. Congressional
for state authority and the avoidance of unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional issues as
reasons for courts declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction), and John D. Carey, Comment, The
Discretionary Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 1995
BYU L. REv. 1263, 1288-94 (categorizing the four main views taken by courts in interpreting what
the supplemental jurisdiction statute allows as follows: the plain meaning approach, the Gibbs standard,
the Executive Software standard, and the (c)(4) approach).
Further, in the case of Rule 20 party joinder, supplemental jurisdiction cannot be utilized to
avoid the complete diversity requirement in cases based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, even
though the claims by or against the joined parties may be transactionally related. See Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Section 1367(b) states:
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties
under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
35. The same policy concerns also spurred the development of the judicial doctrine of pendentjur-
isdiction, although the standard articulated there was whether the claims to be joined arose out of a
"common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). As
the Supreme Court acknowledged, there was considerable overlap between these two jurisdictional
doctrines. See Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 370 (stating that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are "two
species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide
a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?"). That overlap also caused some confu-
sion in determining the correct application of the pendentlancillary jurisdiction nomenclature to varying
situations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute merges the two into one newly named form of
jurisdiction.
36. The propriety of adjudicating certain matters as within the court's ancillary jurisdiction arises
in contexts beyond those involving the pretrial joinder of claims and parties, and in many of those
settings the courts do not rely on a transaction standard as a means of determining whether jurisdiction
is proper. For example, ancillary jurisdiction has been asserted to allow a court to continue jurisdiction
in order to ensure that its judgment is properly carried out, see, e.g., Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300
U.S. 414, 428 (1937), as well as to restrain state court litigation involving issues already determined
in a federal action, see, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
37. A transaction standard also has been used in interpreting otherjurisdictional bases. See, e.g.,
Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 643 (1996) (interpreting jurisdiction
under the Expedited Funds Availability Act).
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endorsement is only implied because the statute itself specifically allows the
assertion of jurisdiction when the additional claims "are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. '38  Although this language does not refer to "transaction,"
the legislative history makes clear that it was meant to include the prior
case law developed by the courts.3  Consequently, a transactional
relationship-again, frequently expressed in terms of whether a logical rela-
tionship is present'-remains a prerequisite for determining whether
41supplemental jurisdiction exists.
A brief look at how the transaction standard evolved under ancillary
jurisdiction reveals both its breadth and its constraints. The Supreme
Court's adoption of ancillary jurisdiction predates the federal rules and
appears in the 1926 case of Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, which
was mentioned earlier.42 The adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, with
their broad provisions for joinder,43 provided increased opportunities for
the application of ancillary jurisdiction, and the courts responded
receptively. Although rule and jurisdiction developments thus essentially
are congruent, 44 jurisdiction was not, and could not, be created by the
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
39. The statute was adopted in response to a recommendation of the Federal Courts Study
Committee that Congress had created. The report of that committee, among other things, called for
the adoption of a statute to clarify the propriety of jurisdiction in cases currently within the judicial
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. See THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 47 (1990). In
particular, it recommended "that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising
out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims,
within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties, namely, defendants
against whom that plaintiff has a closely related state claim." Id.
40. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th
Cir. 1970).
41. See, e.g., Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n, 952 F. Supp. 1399,
1408 (D. Neb. 1997). Because the ancillary and pendent jurisdiction doctrines were merged, however,
reference to the "common nucleus of operative fact" standard also is appropriate, see supra note 35,
and numerous lower courts have resorted to that test rather than utilizing a transactional approach. See,
e.g., Picard v. Bay Area Reg'l Transit Dist., 823 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (N.D. Cal. 1993); James v. Sun
Glass Hut of Cal., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1083, 1084 (D. Colo. 1992).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 23-33.
44. It is most common in cases involving the question whether Rule 13(a) or Rule 13(g) is satisfied
for the courts simultaneously to rule on whether ancillary jurisdiction may be asserted, and the same
transaction analysis is utilized for both inquiries. See, e.g., Blue Dane Simmental, 952 F. Supp. at
1405; State Bank & Trust Co. v. Boat "D.J. Griffin," 731 F. Supp. 770, 773 (E.D. La. 1990); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 110 F.R.D. 272, 278 (N.D. Ii. 1986); Irving
Trust Co. v. Nationwide Leisure Corp., 93 F.R.D. 102, ll'(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Baker v. Gold
Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n. 1 (1974) ("If a counterclaim is compulsory, the federal court
will have ancillary jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would be a matter for state court
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rules.45 This point was elaborated in a well-known Third Circuit opinion
by Chief Judge Biggs, Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper
Co."6 He commented:
It is stated frequently that the determination of ancillary jurisdiction
of a counterclaim in a federal court must turn on whether the
counterclaim is compulsory within the meaning of Rule 13(a). Such
a statement of the law relating to ancillary jurisdiction of
counterclaims is not intended to suggest that Rule 13(a) extends the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain counterclaims for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot expand the jurisdiction of
the United States courts. What is meant is that the issue of the
existence of ancillary jurisdiction and the issue as to whether a
counterclaim is compulsory are to be answered by the same test. It
is not a coincidence that the same considerations that determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory decide also whether the court
has ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate it. The tests are the same
because Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are
designed to abolish the same evil, viz., piecemeal litigation in the
federal courts.47
But to say that the tests are the same does not necessitate identical results
in all cases. This is because courts determining jurisdiction not only have
considerations of judicial economy and convenience to take into account,
but also must make their evaluation against the constitutional constraint that
they are courts of limited jurisdiction. This federalism concern places
increased emphasis on the need to find a clear, logical relationship between
the ancillary and primary claims.
D. Claim Preclusion
The final area in which the transaction standard will be examined is
when it is used to define which claims are precluded from being asserted
because they are within the scope of litigation that already was determined.
As defined in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the dimensions of a
claim for purposes of preclusion "includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose." 4' The use of a transaction standard in the preclusion arena
45. See FED. R. C1V. P. 82 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts"); see also National
Westminster Bank USA v. Cheng, 751 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 ($.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure "cannot expand the basis for subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts").
46. 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961).
47. Id. at 633-34.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(l) (1982).
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emerged in response to changes in modem procedural rules that allowed,
indeed encouraged, the broad joinder of claims and parties.49 As noted
in the Restatement (Second), "The law of res judicata now reflects the
expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their 'entire
controversies' shall in fact do so."50 Like the approach taken in the join-
der and ancillary jurisdiction areas,5' the application of res judicata prin-
ciples rests on a factual analysis of the relation between the various claims
or theories being alleged in order to determine whether they constitute the
same transaction so that additional litigation should not be allowed.5
Further, this approach appears to create a direct tie between ancillary juris-
diction and claim preclusion because it suggests that if a claim would meet
the transaction standard for supplemental jurisdiction purposes and thus
could be brought, then it must be joined or it will be barred. 3
49. The rationale for this is explained in Kilgoar v. Colbert County Board of Education, 578 F.2d
1033 (5th Cir. 1978):
[Ihe modem view regards the same cause of action to refer to all grounds for relief
arising out of the conduct complained of in the original action. Such a view is sensible
where the procedure allows, as the Federal Rules allow, a claimant to put forward all
grounds for relief in one action.
Id. at 1035 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade, 598 F. Supp. 231,
234 (D. Mass. 1984) ("Res judicata is a bar only where the subsequent case concerns the same cause
of action or claim. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the concept of 'cause
of action' has broadened beyond that of a single legal issue narrowly drawn in a writ." (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted)), aft'd, 773 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a.
51. The overlap of jurisdiction and res judicata concerns appears expressly in the Supreme Court's
pronouncement of the standard for asserting pendent jurisdiction. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), the Court prescribed a two-prong test for jurisdiction: that the claims
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," and be ones that the pleader "would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Id. at 725. This latter reference was generally
viewed as referring to the law of claim preclusion. See Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726
F.2d 972, 990 n.54 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the phrase "would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding" is generally interpreted "to mean that the failure to raise a related state
claim would be res judicata in a subsequent action" (emphasis omitted)). Nonetheless, it never appears
to have obtained independent significance as a means of determining when jurisdiction was properly
asserted. See Arthur R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 3 (1985)
(commenting that the importance of the second prong of the Gibbs test is unclear and stating that it is
not surprising that "most courts focus on the common nucleus of operative fact test").
52. See, e.g., Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 302, 310 (D. Mass. 1988)
(defining "transaction" pragmatically by "looking at the facts underlying the two actions" to determine
if they are related in "time, space, origin, or motivation").
53. The Restatement adopts this conclusion, but allows an exception if the second court would find
that the first court "would clearly have declined to exercise [jurisdiction] as a matter of discretion."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e. Some courts have not allowed even that
exception. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 383-84 (Del. Ch. 1980) (requiring a plaintiff
to demonstrate "that the prior court refused, or would have refused" to exercise jurisdiction); Rennie
v. Freeway Transp., 656 P.2d 919, 921-24 (Or. 1982) (precluding plaintiff's claim "even though
plaintiff did not have an absolute right to have his state law claim joined in ... [a prior] federal court
action").
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But differences exist. The effect of finding that a particular claim is
part of the same transaction as another claim already litigated is to prevent
the party asserting the claim from ever being able to present it.
Consequently, the policies underlying that definition require the delicate
balancing of somewhat conflicting interests, including the desire to foster
judicial economy and bring litigation to an end, and the countervailing
interest of the plaintiff in vindicating his rights. 4 The assessment of how
those policies may be affected in a given case will vary depending on var-
ious circumstances. Thus, the Restatement (Second) provides that the
determination of what constitutes a transaction for preclusion purposes must
be determined pragmatically and rests on an evaluation of several
considerations.5 These include matters such as "whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage."56 In short, all
of the policies identified with the three previous uses of the transaction
standard are implicated in this setting.
II. A Comparative View-Avoiding Sin
Having noted the different, albeit often times overlapping, purposes
or policies underlying the use of the transaction standard in the four areas
just outlined, it should be apparent that those differences may affect the
respective determinations in each area. That effect may be seen either in
variances in the definition of what may fall within the scope of a trans-
action or in decisions to recognize exceptions to the standard or to adopt
additional criteria that effectively narrow the circumstances in which a
transactionally related claim or party will be found to otherwise meet the
relevant standard. For example, there legitimately may be an inclination
for a broad and liberal interpretation of what constitutes a transaction when
the question is "Can I join this claim?" and thereby achieve a more eco-
nomical resolution of the controversy. But a more narrow interpretation
may seem appropriate if the question becomes "Is the plaintiff forever
barred from asserting this claim?" Similarly, although notice and fairness
concerns underlie both relation-back questions and claim-preclusion
decisions, the definition of transaction may not be identical in those two
54. These same conflicting policies appear in the Rule 13(a) context when the question posed is
whether a claim was compulsory and should have been introduced in prior litigation and thus has been
waived. See Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1082 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Rule 13(a) is
in some ways a harsh rule.... [It] is a result of a balancing between competing interests. The
convenience of the party with the compulsory counterclaim is sacrificed in the interest of judicial
economy.").
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2).
56. Id.
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settings. In the latter situation, the determination to treat the matter as
within the same transaction deprives the plaintiff of the opportunity to
present a claim at all, and a more narrow interpretation may seem appro-
priate in some circumstances given that effect. In the former, the scope of
the transaction will depend on whether the defendant can be provided a fair
opportunity to defend against the claim, which, depending on the circum-
stances and the stage of the proceedings when the issue is raised, may sug-
gest that a broader interpretation is appropriate.
Stated another way, underlying the decisions in each of the four areas
presented are concerns of convenience and judicial economy. Indeed, those
concerns are the core, if not the exclusive, policies motivating interpreta-
tions of the joinder rules. But additional policies pertain in the other three
areas and these policies may suggest, in some cases, either a more
restrained view of what constitutes a transaction or that other exceptions
should be recognized.' These additional policies involve the following
considerations: notice issues in Federal Rule 15(c) relation-back situations;
constitutional federalism constraints in supplemental jurisdiction cases; and
basic fairness notions in preclusion settings. Consequently, only by consid-
ering the facts and circumstances presented in light of the policies relevant
to a given area can an appropriate decision be made as to what should con-
stitute a transaction.
In many, if not most, instances, all of the above policies may be satis-
fied and the same transaction defined in each of the four settings.
However, as the scope of a proposed transaction is broadened in one set-
ting to incorporate facts and circumstances that, though related, are more
attenuated, policy conflicts may appear that would prevent the same defini-
tion from being used in another setting. When that occurs, these policy
differences may lead to what superficially might seem to be inconsistent
results in which a particular claim may be deemed part of the same trans-
action for one purpose, but not for another. But in fact there would be no
inconsistency. Rather, the elasticity of the transaction concept would be
meeting its purpose of permitting the courts discretion to determine when
related matters should be tried together in light of the context in which the
issue arises and the policies to be fostered thereby. The failure to engage
in that contextual scrutiny would be to commit what Professor Cook rightly
denominated as "original sin" so many years ago.
A few examples best highlight why such a nuanced interpretation is
important and how it would operate. Let me turn first to a comparison of
the use of the transaction standard in Federal Rule 15(c) as contrasted to
its role in the preclusion arena. The question is whether or when the
notice concerns that underlie Federal Rule 15(c) may suggest that relation
57. See supra Part I.
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back is inappropriate, but if the question posed is: "Should these claims
have been joined in one lawsuit so that an omitted claim now should be
precluded?" the answer may be: "Yes, the same transaction is involved."
Consider, for example, a case in which the new matter sought to be intro-
duced by way of amendment involves new theories of relief necessitating
inquiry into some additional facts. Depending on the facts, it could be
argued that, based on the pleadings, such a change was not foreseeable and
it would be an unfair surprise to allow an amendment seeking to expand
the action so broadly, thereby wrongly depriving the defendant of the pro-
tection of the statute of limitations.
This essentially was the situation in McGregor v. Louisiana State
University Board of Supervisors.58 In that case a handicapped law
student, Robert McGregor, had been refused advancement to his second
year and brought suit against the university and various officials claiming
that his rights under the Rehabilitiation Act of 1973 had been violated.
The plaintiff had suffered permanently disabling head and spinal injuries
during the 1970s and was admitted to the law school in 1988.19 Prior to
registration, he had requested that the law school permit him to be a part-
time student in order to accommodate his disability. The law school denied
that request on the grounds that it did not offer a part-time program and
that the academic rules required that entering students attend full-time and
achieve a certain grade point average. The school did, however, provide
several other accommodations.w McGregor enrolled, but failed to meet
the academic requirements during his first year. Nonetheless, the school
readmitted him the next fall on scholastic probation, requiring him to meet
several conditions, including that he carry a full class-load, but providing
him other additional accommodations. 6 When he failed to meet his pro-
bation requirements after another year, McGregor petitioned for additional
accommodations and the school responded by agreeing to readmit him, but
again as a first-year student. He then renewed his petition, requesting that
he be allowed to advance to second-year studies, as well as that he be
58. 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
59. Id. at 854.
60. Initially, the school provided the plaintiff with a handicapped parking permit and additional
time to complete his Criminal Law exam in the fall semester. When he failed to achieve the required
grade point average at the end of that term, the school made other accommodations, such as allowing
him to audit two classes and providing him individual tutoring. Id. at 855-56.
61. The law school provided a class schedule that allowed the plaintiff to attend classes in the
newer building, which was better able to accommodate his wheelchair, and purchased several handi-
capped tables for the classrooms. Several professors also worked directly with the plaintiff on his
academic work outside of class. Additionally, during the fall semester he was allowed to take his
examinations at home with double-time. Although he was required to take his spring examinations at
the school, extra time was provided with special provisions for a room and proctors equipped to
accommodate his needs. Id. at 856.
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given a reduced course-load.62 When that petition was denied, 63 he filed
suit on November 16, 1990.
The basis of McGregor's original complaint was that the law school
discriminated against him by insisting he take a full-time schedule, have in-
class examinations, and only be allowed to advance into the next level upon
achievement of a certain grade point average.' Subsequently, he sought
to amend his complaint on October 31, 1991, to add several professors and
members of the readmissions committee as defendants and to add three due
process claims.' Those claims were to the effect that he was denied due
process in each of his petitions to the law school because the school did not
provide a written procedure or policy notifying him of his right to appeal
the denial of his petition. Because the due process claims were outside the
statute of limitations, the only way in which they could be introduced into
his lawsuit was if the amendment could be deemed to relate back under
Rule 15(c) to the filing of the original complaint. The district court found
that the due process claims did not arise out of the same transaction as the
Rehabilitation Act claims and refused the amendment, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. In an opinion by Judge Zagel, the appellate court noted:
We agree with the district judge that the original complaint
could not have put the Law Center on notice of the due process
claims. The original complaint may suggest that McGregor was not
satisfied with the Law Center's decisions, but it does not plead, even
when liberally construed, that the Law Center's decision-making
process was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. No mention is ever made in the prior pleadings of
any appeals policy or procedure, and a Due Process claim requires
more than a showing that the Law Center refused to accommodate
McGregor as requested. McGregor's amendment attempted to add
a new legal theory unsupported by factual claims raised in the
original complaint. As we see it, the due process claims, seeking
relief for the Law Center's inadequate appeal process, set forth new
and distinct conduct, transactions, or occurrences not found in the
original complaint.'
This decision seems clearly consistent with the notice and fairness con-
cerns underlying Federal Rule 15(c). The scope of the transaction involved
in the McGregor case might be viewed differently, however, if the question
62. Id. at 856-57.
63. The law school did, however, make some adjustments to its readmission decision, reducing
McGregor's schedule of repeated first-year courses to allow him to make room for some upper-class
courses. Id. at 857.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 863 n.20.
66. Id. at 864.
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posed were not whether a time-barred amendment was permissible, but
whether McGregor, having lost a summary judgment motion on his
Rehabilitation Act claims, could file a second lawsuit against the school
claiming a lack of due process in the readmission process. Under those
circumstances, it is most likely that the court would conclude that all the
potential claims or legal theories arising out of McGregor's time at the law
school and the various accommodations and petitions that took place while
he was there ought to have been determined in one lawsuit because they
were all part of the same transaction. Thus, his failure to include them in
his first lawsuit would mean that his due process claims would be
precluded.
Indeed, in a similar case in which a civilian employee was terminated
by the Air Force, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the employee's due process
claims, which were focused on the termination proceeding itself, were part
of the same transaction already resolved in earlier litigation in which the
employee had challenged his termination as being violative of Title VII and
the Privacy Act.67 The conclusion that courts confronting a preclusion
issue most likely would view the transaction more broadly than if a
relation-back question was presented also is supported by numerous preclu-
sion cases in which courts have found that all the relevant theories sup-
porting relief arising out of a dispute between the parties-even those that
involve facts occurring over time6 -should have been tried together as
they were part of the same transaction.69 This broad interpretation is con-
sistent with the fact that res judicata prevents the litigation of not only what
was adjudicated, but also what ought to have been litigated in the first suit
as well. Although fairness is at the heart of the preclusion doctrine, in that
setting fairness encourages a broader interpretation of what is involved in
the transaction in order to provide repose and to protect the defendant from
67. See Keith v. Aldredge, 900 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
When a defendant is accused of successive but nearly simultaneous acts, or acts which
though occurring over a period of time were substantially of the same sort and similarly
motivated, fairness to the defendant as well as the public convenience may require that
they be dealt with in the same action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. d (1982).
69. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1995)
(precluding a RICO action by an abortion clinic against protesters because of an earlier injunction action
against those protesters in the state courts); International Union of Operating Eng'rs-Employers Constr.
Indus. Pension, Welfare, and Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1993)
(precluding an employee benefit trust fund's claim to compel, audit, and recover accurate payments
because of an earlier action involving delinquent payments over a previous period); Shaver v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 840 F.2d 1361, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988) (precluding state law contract claims because
they were part of the same transaction resolved in a prior federal action based on the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
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multiple litigation.7  This is in contrast to the fairness concerns underly-
ing Rule 15(c), which suggest a narrower construction of the transaction
in order to avoid undue surprise to the defendant.1
A similar difference in analysis may appear in circumstances in which
the issue presented is whether a single transaction is present for relation-
back purposes, in contrast to the issue of whether particular parties or
claims may be joined in the same lawsuit and are within the court's supp-
lemental jurisdiction. Different determinations of what falls within the
scope of a transaction in those settings also may be fully justifiable because
the primary concern in the joinder setting is whether judicial economy will
be fostered and repetitive litigation avoided if the claims are tried in the
same lawsuit.' The same concerns support the assertion of supplemental
jurisdiction. In contrast, notice and fairness concerns may counsel a
narrower focus when relation-back questions are at issue. Further, it is
worth noting that the efficiency policies that underlie amendment practice
and encourage a liberal amendment policy are not eroded by a narrower
construction of the transaction in the relation-back setting because,
effectively, the determination not to allow the amendment means that the
additional claim is forever barred by the statute of limitations. A narrower
construction denying the relation-back of the amendment thus does not
result in overlapping, or even additional, lawsuits.
To illustrate this point consider the following case. The owner of a
"key-man" life insurance policy brought a breach-of-contract action against
the insurer for failure to pay on the policy.74 The insurer's defense was
that because the decedent had made false statements concerning his health
in the application, it was not required to honor the contract. The plaintiff
replied that the insurance company's agent knew of the decedent's health
problems because the agent had arranged for another policy just a few
months earlier in which the state of his health was known and that the ear-
lier policy had been replaced by the one at issue. On the morning of trial,
the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add a negligence count,
70. See Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 147 (N.J. 1991) (characterizing the underlying ratio-
nale of res judicata as fairness by providing "finality and repose for the litigating parties"); 18 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 4403, at 15-16 (discussing the importance of repose for ensuring
fairness).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22; Kimbro v. United States Rubber Co., 22 F.R.D.
309, 311 (D. Conn. 1958) ("[IThe test [for relation back of amendments under Rule 15(c)] is whether
the original pleading 'clearly gave defendant notice that he would be held [liable] for all acts of
negligence.'" (quoting Michelsenv. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 416 (2d Cir. 1943))); 6A WRIGHT, MILLER
& KANE, supra note 12, § 1497, at 85-89 (describing the courts' narrower construction of transactions
under Rule 15(c) to ensure defendants receive adequate notice).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
74. See Johnson Int'l Co. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 966 (D. Neb. 1993), aft'd,
19 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1994).
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claiming that the insurer, through its agent, was negligent when it failed to
advise plaintiff of certain risks arising out of the replacement of the earlier
policy.75
The statute of limitations with regard to the negligence theory had
expired at the time the amendment was introduced so that the only way in
which the claim could proceed was if the court found that it met the stan-
dards of Federal Rule 15(c). The court refused to allow relation-back,
finding that the defendant "could not have reasonably anticipated it might
have liability for negligent failure to give the replacement policy warning
when it was served with the plaintiff's 1988 complaint and when it
thereafter engaged in discovery respecting that complaint."'76 Further, the
court noted that "the factual thrust of the two theories of recovery is so
different that a reasonably prudent person would not have perceived
exposure on the negligence theory of recovery when served with the
complaint on the contract theory of recovery."' Consequently, the court
found that the amendment did not arise out of the same transaction as the
one set forth in the original complaint.78
Again, the court's conclusion appears sound, particularly given that
the amendment was sought after discovery was completed and the trial was
scheduled to begin. This is true even though both the negligence and
contract claims sprang from the same course of dealings between the
insurer's agent and the decedent. In analogous situations when joinder
questions are posed, however, different conclusions may be reached. For
example, in one case insureds were allowed to join a claim seeking a
declaratory judgment against their insurer that their policy provided
coverage for a particular occurrence with a claim against the insurance
agents alleging that they misrepresented the policy coverage when selling
it to the insureds.79 More generally, in contract disputes all the parties
involved in the course of dealings that lead to a contract typically have
been allowed to be joined in order to allow one adjudication to resolve who
may be at fault.'o The contract becomes the transactional nexus support-
ing joinder. Further, even when additional claims rest on tort rather than
contract theories, courts have found their joinder proper and the transaction
75. See id. at 969.
76. Id. at 970.
77. Id. at 971 (footnote omitted).
78. See id.
79. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Intraco, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 554, 556-57 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
80. Indeed, in the cross-claim context, the transaction standard has been met when multiple con-
tracts are involved in a complex business transaction involving multiple parties, stretching over a period
of time. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143,
147 (6th Cir. 1969); R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Alumisteel Sys., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D.
Md. 1980) (both holding that a prime contract and several subcontracts that dealt with one building pro-
ject arose from the same transaction or occurrence).
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standard met.' The change in theory, even when it necessitates an
inquiry into some additional facts, does not preclude joinder; the goal of
promoting judicial economy and efficiency predominates.'
Similar broad interpretations of what constitutes a transaction are
reached in cases presenting jurisdiction issues in which different state and
federal theories are alleged to support relief for harm arising out of a
particular course of conduct. 3 Preclusion decisions also support a broad
interpretation of what constitutes a transaction so as to include within its
scope tort and contract claims that spring from a particular course of
dealings. The failure to join all such claims in one lawsuit will result in
the preclusion of any omitted claim.' As noted in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments:
That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor
may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions
and hence multiple claims. This remains true although the several
81. See, e.g.. Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Gough, 160 F.R.D. 467,469 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that
a medical malpractice claim was a compulsory counterclaim in a medical center's action for unpaid
medical bills); Banner Indus. v. Sansom, 830 F. Supp. 325, 328 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (ruling that a def-
amation claim was a compulsory counterclaim in a breach of contract action). In the cross-claim
context, a logical relation has been found between an insurance company's primary claim seeking a
declaratory judgment of noncoverage and a cross-claim by the injured party against the insured seeking
tort damages. See, e.g., Plains Ins. Co. v. Sandoval, 35 F.R.D. 293 (D. Colo. 1964). The justifica-
tion is that the insured's defense against liability is similar to the reason for asserting noncoverage by
the insurance company. See id. at 296. If it is different, then no logical relationship will be found.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 87 F.R.D. 1, 5 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (finding that because a
cross-claim was not related to whether there was insurance protection, the claim did not arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence).
82. The key, of course, is whether there are significant overlapping facts or whether entirely new
or unrelated facts will need to be proven so that little efficiency would be gained by treating the theories
as springing from a single transaction and allowing their joinder in a single lawsuit. The inclusion in
some of the joinder rules of language authorizing joinder when a "series" of transactions is involved
also may allow the claims to go forward together, when the reference to a single transaction in Federal
Rule 15(c) would not. Compare Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 1993) (denying
relation-back in a medical malpractice case asserting a lack of informed consent when the amendment
sought to add claims related to negligence that occurred during and after surgery), with Rodriguez v.
Abbott Labs., 151 F.R.D. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting the plaintiff to join the drug manufacturer
against whom he was asserting a products liability claim with the hospital against whom he was assert-
ing a medical malpractice claim for aggravating his injuries), and Lucas v. City of Juneau, 127 F.
Supp. 730, 732 (D. Alaska 1955) (allowing the plaintiff to join both the store owner and the ambulance
company in the same action seeking relief for an initial injury and the aggravation of that injury). The
difference in treatment and in the language of the rules themselves reflects the more cautious approach
necessary in the Rule 15(c) context because of notice concerns, which are not present when joinder is
at issue.
83. Because ancillary jurisdiction was developed in order to allow state and federal claims to be
joined in one suit, changes in theory or in the source of the governing law, standing alone, cannot be
a barrier to its assertion; otherwise the doctrine would serve no purpose.
84. See, e.g., Mortell v. Mortell Co., 887 F.2d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989); Dowd v. Society of
St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1988); Fiumara v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d
87, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1984).
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legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would
emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different
measures of liability or different kinds of relief.8
5
The foregoing discussion should not be taken to suggest that the
interpretation of what constitutes a transaction always will be the same for
joinder and res judicata purposes simply because those two doctrines rest
on shared efficiency and judicial economy concerns. The overlap is great
and in most instances probably will result in identical applications of the
standard.' Nonetheless, in some circumstances, the additional preclusion
concerns of ensuring that the party asserting the new claim is treated fairly
and has an opportunity to be heard' may result in a narrower'
interpretation of the transaction involved in the first suit than would be the
case if the issue posed were whether the claims could be joined at the
outset of the litigation. 9 Consider, for example, one district court case
in which a supplier sued one of its customers, which was attempting to take
it over, alleging ten specified acts that violated the federal securities
laws.' After it lost, the supplier then sued claiming federal antitrust
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. c (1982).
86. See Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Adm'rs, Inc., 31 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that the Fourth Circuit's test for compulsory counterclaims has been described as
"ask[ing] little more than whether the plaintiff's claims would be barred by res judicata").
87. Although the Supreme Court suggested in one case that claim preclusion may be limited by
a requirement that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action, see Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,480-81 (1982), no broad exception has emerged. Rather, what
I am suggesting here is that those concerns may suggest a somewhat more restrained definition of the
scope of the transaction involved in the first proceeding if circumstances support it.
88. Because an additional requirement for claim preclusion is that the omitted claim be one that
could have been brought in the first action, the scope of a transaction for preclusion purposes cannot
be broader than that allowed under the joinder rules; it can only be narrower.
89. This point was implicitly recognized by Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970), when he disagreed with the majority's
finding that the counterclaim at issue was compulsory and within the court's ancillary jurisdiction. He
noted:
Of course, it is tempting to stretch a point when a jurisdictional objection is so belatedly
raised by the very party who clamored for the exercise of jurisdiction until the decision
went against it. But we must consider the question as if Heyward [the defendant] had not
pleaded the Stelma counterclaim and proceeded to sue D'Agostino in some other court for
failure to perform that subcontract, and D'Agostino then claimed that Heyward's failure
to bring the Stelma transaction into this Miller Act suit barred the later action. Despite the
desirability of requiring that all claims which in fact arise "out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim" be litigated in a single
action, courts must be wary of extending these words in a way that could cause
unexpectedly harsh results.
Id. at 1087 (Friendly, J., concurring).
90. See GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,588 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The
decision is explained and approved by noting that in some cases litigation complexity and confusion
may justify splitting claims in situations that otherwise might appear tightly related. See 18 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 4408, at 70.
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violations stemming from the same ten acts and one additional act.
Preclusion was denied.91 Yet, had the issue been whether the supplier
could join with its securities act claims additional fraud claims or state
unfair competition claims arising out of the same ten acts, numerous juris-
diction cases make clear that the answer would be: "Yes, the claims are
sufficiently related."' Cases involving compulsory counterclaims simi-
larly hold that defendant's assertion of a state tort claim in response to
plaintiff's claim of antitrust' or trademark9' violations meets the trans-
action standard of Federal Rule 13(a), as long as the counterclaim rests on
the same or overlapping facts.
This discrepancy in treatment also is seen most readily when consider-
ing the scope of preclusion as applied to transactionally related
counterclaims. In particular, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
provides that in jurisdictions in which a compulsory counterclaim rule
exists, such as in the federal courts, preclusion applies if a counterclaim
that would fall within the joinder standard is omitted. 9  However, it
recognizes that in jurisdictions without compulsory joinder rules, the case-
law suggests that preclusion will not obtain unless "[t]he relationship
between the counterclaim and the plaintiff's claim is such that successful
prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or
would impair rights established in the initial action."96 Admittedly, it can
be argued that in those jurisdictions, the res judicata determination is not
based on a narrow construction of what constitutes a transaction, but
91. See GAF Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 73,588 (denying preclusion because the two
claims were "grounded on different theories containing different elements and requiring different factual
determinations").
92. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1975) (permitting federal
court jurisdiction of breach of fiduciary duty claims in addition to claims of violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Vanderboomv. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1242 (8th Cir. 1970) (reversing a dis-
missal of state fraud claims that had been brought with a claim of violation of federal securities law);
cf. Tacker v. Wilson, 830 F. Supp. 422, 431 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (allowing joinder of a state tort claim
with an antitrust claim because the tort claim was "an outgrowth of the alleged conspiracy, and the
alleged conspiracy form[ed] the basis of the Sherman Act claim").
93. See, e.g., Centennial Sch. Dist. v. IndependenceBlue Cross, 885 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); Sikes v. Rubin Law Offices, P.C., 102 F.R.D. 259, 262 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Super Prods.
Corp. v. D P Way Corp., 75 F.R.D. 659, 661 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
94. See, e.g., Polaris Pool Sys. v. Letro Prods., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 422, 425 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publications, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1393, 1407 (D. Or. 1990),
aft'd, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(a) cmt. e (1982). Courts refer to the
problem of the omitted compulsory counterclaim using various terminology, such as waiver, estoppel,
and res judicata. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 12, § 1417, at 131-34. Whatever the
nomenclature, the ultimate determination turns on a finding of whether the omitted claim was part of
the same transaction as claims raised in earlier litigation.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(b); see 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 12, § 4414, at 110-14.
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effectively rests on another test entirely. Nonetheless, even though the
defendant could have asserted a transactionally related counterclaim,
because the rules did not require its assertion in those jurisdictions, courts
have refused to adopt as broad an approach to the scope of res judicata as
typically is utilized to determine when joinder is proper. 7  I would
suggest that the reason for this difference is because of heightened concerns
of assuring that the defendant is treated fairly. The defendant was not
forewarned in the applicable joinder rules of the perils of omitting a
transactionally related counterclaim, and the defendant did not choose the
time or place of the lawsuit as well. These concerns outweigh the court's
interest in promoting judicial economy. In effect, the courts in
jurisdictions not having compulsory counterclaim rules have recognized an
exception to the transaction standard when preclusion is at issue.
Finally, let us turn to a comparison of the treatment of the transaction
standard in joinder and jurisdiction settings. Here the symmetry in the
underlying policies results in virtually identical treatment. Given the
intertwined history of the development of the transaction standard in the
joinder and jurisdiction contexts, 9 it should not be surprising that the
meaning of transaction appears coterminous in those settings. This does
not mean, however, that the additional federalism policy constraints under-
lying jurisdiction questions are ignored. Rather, federalism concerns are
addressed as part of the court's discretion under the supplemental jurisdic-
tion statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c). Unlike joinder, in which the par-
ties have a right to assert the additional claims or join the additional parties
if the particular rule's requirements are met, the assertion of supplemental
jurisdiction is discretionary. 9  Further, as provided in the statute, the
court is directed to take into account when determining whether to exercise
its discretion some factors that effectively address the fact that federal court
97. For example, contrast the treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. There is no rule requirement
that plaintiffs join all transactionally related claims in a single action. See FED. R. CIv. P. 18.
Nonetheless, a plaintiff who omits such a claim may be precluded from asserting it in subsequentlitiga-
tion under general preclusion rules. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
99. Prior to the enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, courts evaluating the propriety
of asserting ancillary jurisdiction typically focused solely on whether the necessary nexus to the main
claim existed. Courts primarily exercised their discretion to decline jurisdiction in situations in which
the main claim was dismissed or resolved in early stages of the litigation and the question presented
was whether to retain jurisdiction to determine the ancillary claim. See, e.g., Scott v. Long Island Say.
Bank, 937 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1991); Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1978); Mirkin, Barre,
Saltzstein, Gordon, Hermann & Kreisberg, P.C. v. Noto, 94 F.R.D. 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The
notion that the court should consider discretionary factors when initially determining jurisdiction was
part of the pendent jurisdiction analysis set forth by the Supreme Court, however. See United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The merger of ancillary and pendentjurisdiction in the
supplemental jurisdiction statute and the inclusion of specific discretionary factors there, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) (1994), makes those discretionary factors relevant for all jurisdictional assertions today.
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jurisdiction is limited and that decisions to assume jurisdiction must be
made carefully in order to avoid improperly intruding on state
interests.1tu Consequently, because of the adoption of these additional
discretionary criteria, there is not a need to consider the limited jurisdiction
or federalism concerns in the context of determining whether the trans-
action requirement has been satisfied. Those policies are effectuated
through other means.
Although a comparison of the transaction standard in joinder and juris-
diction cases reveals no real difference in treatment, the joinder cases them-
selves reveal that differences in definition may occur between cases in
which thejoinder issue involves additional parties and claims under Federal
Rule 20, in contrast to those involving pure claim joinder under Federal
Rule 13. In the former context, the courts reflect heightened concern
regarding the potential complication of the case caused by the joinder of
additional parties. As a result, there is greater scrutiny on the level of
factual overlap between the claims needed to support joinder. Claims that
in two-party litigation might be determined to arise out of the same trans-
action and thus fall within the court's supplemental jurisdiction may be
found to present sufficient new facts so that they will not meet the trans-
action standard in a multiple-party context. 10 1
These differences in interpretation also are supportable as a matter of
policy. Effectively, the conclusion that the standard is not met in the Rule
20 context represents a determination that efficiency concerns would not be
clearly promoted by joinder and may be outweighed by the complications
introduced into the case by including the additional parties. Those consid-
erations certainly are properly within a court's purview. Thus, assessing
what constitutes a transaction in light of the underlying policies involved
may produce different determinations even when the same policies are
implicated, at least when the issue arises in a different context. In sum,
great sensitivity to policy differences (in some instances mere policy
nuances) is needed when attempting to make generalizations about when
applicable transaction standards are met.
100. In particular, the statute provides that the court may consider in deciding whether to decline
jurisdiction if "the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law," and if "the [additional] claim
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(2).
101. Compare Magnavox Co. v. APF Electronics, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 29, 34 (N.D. l. 1980), in
which the court refusedjoinder under Rule 20(a) of two retailer defendants in a suit claiming that goods
sold by each defendant infringed plaintiffs patent, with LASA PerL'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per
Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 145-47 (6th Cir. 1969), and R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v.
Alumisteel Systems, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D. Md. 1980), which deal with cross-claims involving
multiple contracts.
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II. Conclusion
As underscored by the illustrations in the preceding section, care must
be taken when applying the transaction standard to the varying doctrines
and rules for which it serves as a gatekeeper. The standard's inherent flex-
ibility provides the courts discretion to develop the law in light of the cir-
cumstances of each case, while fostering judicial efficiency and economy
and promoting decisions on the merits, rather than relying on rigid rules
or technicalities. That very flexibility, however, also offers a trap for the
unwary lawyer who does not understand how varying policies may influ-
ence its interpretation in separate contexts.
It is possible to arrive at an appropriate definition in a given case only
by considering whether the proposed scope of a transaction will meet the
objectives and policies underlying the standard that is involved. Further,
arguments as to what should be included within a particular transaction are
best made by referring to those related policies as they provide the basis
for a broad or narrow interpretation of the standard as applied to the fac-
tual circumstances involved. Consequently, although this piece does not
(indeed cannot) provide an answer to the question of what constitutes a
transaction, it is hoped that it points the way for others as to how to
approach that inquiry with greater understanding of what should be
entailed.
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